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BENJAMIN

ECTOGENESIS: IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
SUBSTRATE-INDEPENDENT WOMBS?
BRIT JANEWAY BENJAMIN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ectogenesis is the gestation of a fetus independent of a woman’s
body.1 The technology is sometimes called an “artificial womb,” “uterine replicator,” or “exowomb.”2 The term “ectogenesis” was first used
by J.B.S. Haldane in a 1923 lecture to the Heretics Society at Cambridge
entitled “Daedalus or Science and the Future.”3 Haldane’s address predicted that by 1945, scientists would make successful use of an external
uterus to support an embryo from conception to birth at nine months.4
He estimated that by the year 2073, ectogenesis would be a universally
accessed technology, with only thirty percent of new births being “of
woman.”5 Daedalus directly inspired Aldous Huxley’s 1932 novel,
Brave New World, perhaps the most widely-known depiction of ectogenesis.6 In that story, the individual’s complete subjugation to the omnipresent state is effectuated, in part, by the restriction of reproduction
to state-controlled hatcheries where children are gestated in artificial
wombs, subjected to chemical conditioning, and raised on a diet of
brainwashing and drugs intended to cultivate obedient citizens.7
Since the term originated, ectogenesis has been woven into
countless works of science fiction and science fantasy, often encapsulating humanity’s deepest insecurities about the locus of women’s bodies in the perpetuation of our species, the source of life, and the
©2020 Brit Janeway Benjamin
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1
See infra Section II.
2
Archuman, Ectogenesis and Exowombs: Will Sex Become Extinct?, HUMANITY+ (June 29,
2017),
https://humanityplus.wordpress.com/2017/06/29/will-sex-become-extinct/;
LOIS
MCMASTER BUJOLD, ETHAN OF ATHOS 34 (1986).
3
J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS OR SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE (1924).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 63, 65.
6
Elle Shan Wei, 1923 – Term ‘Ectogenesis’ Coined, NEXT NATURE NETWORKS (May 24, 2017),
https://nextnature.net/magazine/story/2017/1923-term-ectogenesis-coined.
7
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
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uniqueness of human labor. Lois McMaster Bujold’s 1986 novel Ethan
of Athos depicts a colony populated by males alone.8 Their planetary
religion holds women “to be inciters to sin, or sin [is] inherent in them,
like juice in an orange, or sin [is] caught from them like a virus.”9 All
children born on Athos (sex-selected males, of course), are inseminated
in artificial wombs called “uterine replicators,” which combine the prospective father’s sperm with ovarian tissue cultures brought to the planet
by Athos’ Founding Fathers.10 To the Athosians, living women are imagined as little more than “uterine replicators with legs.”11 This dystopian vision reflects a fear echoed by numerous feminists: without the
leverage women obtain from their status as reproductive hosts, women
will lose a primary source of their already limited social power.12 Andrea Dworkin cautioned that ectogenesis will render women “biologically expendable,” “make reproduction controllable by men on a scale
heretofore unimaginable,” and usher in an era of “absolute state control
of the uterus.”13 Dworkin predicts a coming “gynocide,” the elimination
of women en masse due to their reproductive obsolescence.14 Feminists
are divided on the issue of “natural” childbirth.15 Shulamith Firestone’s
1970 Dialectic of Sex held that until views of a woman’s choice “not to
have children or not to have them ‘naturally’ is at least as legitimate as
traditional childbearing, women are as good as forced into their female
roles.”16 Firestone asserts that ectogenesis would enable equalization of
the “natural reproductive difference” that was the origin of the first division of labor and thus “furnished the paradigm” of “discrimination
based on biological characteristics.”17 She concludes that the introduction of the technology will be liberating for women, “unless … improperly used.”18

8

BUJOLD, supra note 2.
BUJOLD, supra note 2.
10
BUJOLD, supra note 2, at 10.
11
BUJOLD, supra note 2, at 12.
12
See ROBYN ROWLAND, CRUMBLING MOTHERHOOD: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY CREATING
WOMEN’S PROCREATIVE ALIENATION (1987); JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS:
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM (1994).
13
ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 187, 192–93 (1983).
14
Id. at 194.
15
See Lizzie Garret Mettler, Is “Natural Motherhood” More Feminist?, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mettler-natural-motherhood-breastfeeding-attachment-parenting-20171117-story.html.
16
SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 200 (1970).
17
Id. at 9.
18
Id. at 196 (improper use, to Firestone, includes state control of the technology and application
to governmental aims).
9
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Dystopian criticisms and fantasies betray the untested, but presumably widely held expectation that gestation bestows at least part of
what makes humans human. Even Macbeth, all but invincible with “a
charmed life, which must yield not/To one of woman born,” was ultimately slain by Macduff who was “untimely ripp’d” from his mother’s
body.19 Long before futurist depictions of artificial wombs, gestational
status marked Macduff as somehow exempt from the rules governing
other human agents. Some have held forth that the transition from viviparous gestation to ectogenesis would lead to the production of offspring that are “nothing but psychological monsters.”20
Much of scientific fact was once science fiction. Due to ongoing
progress in reproductive medicine and technology, the naissance of ectogenesis is forthcoming. The already ample body of artistic and academic work relating to ectogenesis indicates that were ectogenesis to be
perfected, its adoption would induce significant social change and might
induce political crisis. In hopes of contributing to the situation of ectogenesis in the body of substantive due process jurisprudence, the focus
of this manuscript will be the constitutional interests implicated by the
invention of ectogenesis, specifically limited to the context of the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
This paper argues that the scope of procreative liberty is broad
enough, as currently defined and reasoned, to encompass the use of ectogenetic and other reproductive biotechnologies. First, I will present
the essential technological background details, including the present
state of research on ectogenesis and developments relating to neonatal
and reproductive care.21 Second, is an overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the liberty interest in having decisional autonomy
regarding procreative choices and child-rearing decisions limited to the
context of the DPC.22 Third, I apply that jurisprudence to the issue of
ectogenesis, arguing that the current state of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence strongly suggests that ectogenesis is a fundamental procreative liberty deserving of heightened protection from state interference.23 Finally, I address potential state interests that might be raised in
support of a ban on ectogenesis, or laws that might otherwise substantially curtail an individual’s access to ectogenetic technology.24

19

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 8, l. 2489–94.
117 CONG. REC. 12744 (1971) (citing Man Into Superman: The Promise and Peril of The
New Genetics, TIME (1971)).
21
See infra Section II.
22
See infra Section III.
23
See infra Sections IV.–V.
24
See infra Section VI.
20

BENJAMIN

170

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 20:2

Haldane’s 1923 address to the Heretics contained a poignant
warning about the “profound emotional and ethical effect” of scientific
advances on humanity.25 He states:
“There is no great invention, from fire to flying,
which has not been hailed as an insult to some
god…There is hardly one which, on first being
brought to the notice of an observer from any nation which had not previously heard of their existence, would not appear to him as indecent and
unnatural.”26
In the realm of reproductive care and ectogenetic technology, moral appeals to nature and stereotypes based on dystopian science fiction carry
the risk of veering into unconstitutional denials of fundamental liberties
for those who would rely on this technology for their safety and selfdetermination.
II. BACKGROUND
Ectogenetic technology may be applied to multiple goals. Partial
ectogenesis, “the growth and development of fetuses between 14 and 35
weeks of pregnancy,” describes the preservation of premature fetal life
via the application of technology outside of the uterus following a preterm birth.27 This has also been called “neonatal incubation” and is distinguished from true “ectogestation.”28 Partial ectogenesis is an accurate
description of the life-saving measures used in neonatal intensive care
units (NICUs) across the globe.29 These methods could be applied to
spontaneous preterm births, as well to those early deliveries necessary
to preserve maternal or fetal health and life.30 Full ectogenesis, “the implantation and full development of fetuses in vitro,” has long been anticipated but is predicated upon the development of both a functional,
external uterus and the ancillary technologies for providing nutrients,
25

HALDANE, supra note 3, at 43.
HALDANE, supra note 3, at 44.
27
Carlo Bulletti et al., The Artificial Womb, 1221 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 124, 127 (2011).
28
Elselijn Kingma & Suki Finn, Neonatal incubator or artificial womb? Distinguishing ectogestation and ectogenesis using the metaphysics of pregnancy, 34 BIOETHICS 354, 356 (2020).
29
Bulletti et al., supra note 27.
30
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRIC
PRACTICE, MEDICALLY INDICATED LATE-PRETERM AND EARLY-TERM DELIVERIES (Feb. 2019),
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/committee-opinion/articles/2019/02/medically-indicated-late-preterm-and-early-term-deliveries.
26
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oxygen, and hormones to, and removing waste from, the developing fetus.31 Full ectogenesis would allow women without uteruses, or with
uterine malformations and deformities, as well as gay men to procreate
without the involvement of a surrogate.32 Heterosexual couples seeking
a more egalitarian division of parental labor might also prefer full ectogenesis to maternal gestation. Ectogenesis might be a compelling option
for women who wish to have genetically related children but do not wish
to gestate, or whose professional commitments render gestation impossible, difficult, or unsafe. The loss of bodily integrity that women face
during gestation may be unacceptable to some women, who, without
ectogenesis, face a choice between parenthood and bodily integrity.33
Furthermore, the risks of physical gestation are non-trivial, even with
modern obstetrics.34 Women might choose to pursue elective ectogenesis to avoid the risks inherent to physical gestation and delivery.35
In 1997, Lee Silver claimed that ectogenetic technology was on
the “more distant horizon,” and that while its development was possible,
the development timescale is on the order of centuries, not decades.36 In
part, Silver based this conclusion on the once true twenty-fifth week
viability mark, noting that even when utilizing “the best neonatal technology available, we cannot push the point of viability back any further
simply because a younger fetus cannot breathe.”37 Silver held that solving the problem of immature fetal lungs was such an “extremely difficult technical problem” and that pushing the date of viability back further would be a very slow process.38 Per a June 2016 joint publication
by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the
Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine, the published data regarding
premature newborns in the United States, England, and Australia indicates a substantial improvement in the survival rates of periviable infants in the past decade.39 The report reveals that the rates of “survival
31

Bulletti et al., supra note 27, at 124.
For a discussion of the ethics and potential conflicts emerging from procreation via surrogate,
see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 130–37 (1994).
33
EVIE KENDAL, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE CASE FOR STATE SPONSORED ECTOGENESIS 6
(2015).
34
See infra Part VII–A.1.
35
See infra Part VII–A.1.
36
LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL
TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 67 (1997).
37
Id. at 66.
38
Id.
39
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, SOCIETY FOR MATERNALFETAL MEDICINE, OBSTETRIC CARE CONSENSUS: PERIVIABLE BIRTH 2 (2017),
32
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to discharge” is 23-27% for births at twenty-three weeks, 42-59% at
twenty-four weeks, and 67-76% at twenty-five weeks.40 For these surviving periviable infants, the “incidence of moderate-to-severe neurodevelopment impairment” decreases with each additional week of gestation from 43% at twenty-two weeks to 24% at twenty-five weeks.41
From Silver’s vantage point, these figures illustrate unexpected rapid
progress in the world of obstetrics, a departure from the limitations of
1997 where “survival [was] possible as early as 25 weeks with sophisticated neonatal care.”42
Several researchers have made progress on the development of
bioprosthetic and synthetic uteruses.43 In 1996, Yoshinori Kuwabara,
then-chairman of Tokyo’s Jutendo University Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, had successfully developed a technique for gestating
periviable goat fetuses in a synthetic uterus termed “extrauterine fetal
incubation.”44 While Kuwabara’s team faced eventual “problems with
circulatory failure” and other “technical difficulties,” they preserved the
lives of goat fetuses for three weeks.45 Despite these difficulties, their
successes with supplying “the fetuses with oxygenated blood while suspending them in incubators that contain artificial amniotic fluid heated
to body temperature” were widely-reported as important advances in
embryology.46
Dr. Hung-Ching Liu, a researcher at Cornell University’s Department of Reproductive Medicine, whose ultimate goal is to develop
a functioning “external womb,” grew a bioprosthetic uterus by “adding
engineered endometrium tissue to a bio-engineered, extra-uterine ‘scaffold.’”47 In 2003, her team successfully gestated a mouse embryo in this
bioprosthetic uterus, almost to full term.48 Following that success, Dr.
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/obstetric-care-consensus/articles/2017/10/periviable-birth (providing the definition of periviable as a “delivery occurring from 20 0/7 weeks
to 25 6/7 of gestation”).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
SILVER, supra note 36, at 68 (emphasis added).
43
To avoid applying the term “artificial” to the technology, I use bioprosthetic to mean a uterus
grown in a lab from human tissue and synthetic to mean a non-tissue uterus, made of inorganic
materials.
44
Perri Klass, The Artificial Womb Is Born, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/the-artificial-womb-is-born.html?_r=0.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Soraya Chemaly, What Do Artificial Wombs Mean for Women?, REWIRE (Feb. 23, 2012),
https://rewire.news/article/2012/02/23/what-do-artificial-wombs-mean-women/.
48
Id. (At this time, Dr. Liu was serving as the Director of the Reproductive Endocrine Laboratory at the Center for Reproductive Medicine and Infertility at Cornell.)
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Liu grew a human embryo in a similar bioengineered uterus for ten days,
terminating the incubation prior to the fourteen-day limit placed on embryological researchers.49 The fourteen-day rule emerged from a 1979
report by the United States Ethics Advisory Board (an outgrowth of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) and was later adopted
in at least seventeen countries, either via specific legislation or government-commissioned scientific guidelines.50 The rule prohibits research
on growing human embryos beyond fourteen days from fertilization.51
In 2016, the movement to revisit the fourteen-day rule began
gaining international momentum amongst bioethicists and researchers,
given the advances in embryology and the potential medical value of
research on early human development.52 In May of 2016, groups of researchers at Cambridge University and Rockefeller University in New
York announced their successful maintenance of human embryos in
vitro for thirteen days.53 These advances, likely attributable to “[a]n improved culture medium and a better substrate for embryo attachment,”
have reopened the conversation regarding ethical limitations on embryological research.54 With this research, scientists have narrowed the window of time where ex vivo gestation is impossible to the period between
two and twenty-two weeks.55 Given the irregular rate of advancement
in this field and the uncertain legal landscape undergirding it, it could
be anywhere from a few years to several decades until that gap is filled.
In April of 2017, researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP) Research Institute published the results of their fetal
lamb study of an innovative sealed “biobag,” which was designed to
mimic the conditions of the uterus as much as possible.56 Their system
enabled the extracorporeal gestation of extremely premature fetal lambs
for four weeks “without apparent physiologic derangement or organ
failure.”57 The researchers’ system includes a pumpless, low-resistance
oxygenator circuit (to oxygenate the fetal blood), a closed biobag filled
with synthetic amniotic fluid (within which the fetus was incubated),
49

Id.
Insoo Hyun, et al., Embryology Policy: Revisit the 14-day Rule, 533 NATURE 170 (2016).
51
Id. at 171.
52
Id. at 169–70.
53
Sarah Knapton, ‘Artificial Womb’ Breakthrough Sparks Row Over How Long Human Embryos Should Be Kept in Lab, THE TELEGRAPH, May 4, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2016/05/04/artificial-womb-breakthrough-sparks-row-over-how-long-human-embr/.
54
Janet Rossant, Implantation Barrier Overcome, 533 NATURE 182 (2016).
55
Knapton, supra note 53; THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS,
SOCIETY FOR MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE, supra note 39.
56
Emily Partridge et al., An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme premature lamb, NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 1, 1–3 (2017).
57
Id. at 2.
50
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and an umbilical interface with the oxygenator.58 The oxygenator circuit
is pumpless due to the risk of overloading the fragile fetal heart; the
circuit is powered by the beating of the fetus’ heart.59 The researchers’
results were “superior to all previous attempts at extracorporeal support
of the extreme premature fetus in both duration and physiologic wellbeing.”60 The lambs grew up normally.61
In October of 2019, researchers at the Dutch Eindhoven University of Technology were awarded a grant of 2.9 million Euros to build a
new prototype of an artificial womb.62 The grant, awarded through the
Horizon 2020 EU Program, enables the Dutch researchers to build on
the successful incubation of lambs at CHOP, this time using 3D printed
replicas of human babies monitored with sensors to test an environment
built to more accurately model the experience of a human baby in
utero.63 Announcements of such highly visible advances are always accompanied by predictable, short-lived bioethicist handwringing.64 The
news reports rarely fail to mention the imminent Huxleyan dystopia and
never fail to ignore the millions of infants who need improved incubation, parents who need alternatives to gestation or gestational surrogacy,
or the role of reproductive privacy in American constitutional jurisprudence.65 Advances in the unsexy sub-components of these artificial
womb prototypes likewise march forward, but without fanfare: better
fluid filtration, tubing, substrates, and scaffolds.66
58

Id. at 4, fig. 1.
Id. at 2.
60
Id.
61
Nicola Davis, Artificial womb: Dutch researchers given €2.9m to develop prototype, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/oct/08/artificial-wombdutch-researchers-given-29m-to-develop-prototype.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
E.g., Katarina Lee, Ectogenesis, VOICES IN BIOETHICS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/bioethics/article/view/5961 (last visited Jan. 16, 2021); Anna
Smajdor, The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 336
(2007); Vernellia Randall & Tshaka C. Randall, Built in Obsolescence: The Coming End to the
Abortion Debate, SSRN (Aug. 22, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112367.
65
E.g., Joseph Krol, Ectogenesis: a brave new world?, VARSITY ONLINE (2017),
https://www.varsity.co.uk/science/14017; Michael Cook, BioEdge: We must prepare for artificial wombs, say bioethicists, BIOEDGE (2020), https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/we-must-prepare-for-artificial-wombs-say-bioethicists/13415 (last visited Jan 16, 2021); Paula Mejia, Fetuses in Artificial Wombs: Medical Marvel or Misogynist Malpractice?, NEWSWEEK (2014),
https://www.newsweek.com/fetuses-artificial-wombs-medical-marvel-or-misogynist-malpractice-263308 (last visited Jan 16, 2021).
66
See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION (2018). Coleman draws a distinction between research aimed
59
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Whether it takes years or decades, we should be prepared to
grapple with the right to procreate via ectogenesis whenever the perfected technologies arrive. Beyond ectogenesis, the same body of law
ensuring a robust right to reproductive privacy under the Due Process
Clause ought to protect the use of other forms of reproductive biotechnology. If the fundamental right to reproduce extends to ectogenesis,
which I argue herein that it does, so does it extend to protect the individual use of in vitro fertilization, traditional gestational surrogacy, and
other forms of reproductive biotechnology as of yet unknown to us.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”67 The plenary power afforded to the states is broad, and the Court will uphold a
legislative act as long as “there is an evil at hand for correction, and that
it might be thought that the particular legislative measure is a rational
way to correct it.”68 This “rational basis test” is “enormously deferential
to the government and rarely have laws been declared unconstitutional
for failing to meet this standard of review.”69 However, when a law violates a fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections activate the “strict scrutiny” standard of review that shifts the burden to
the governmental actor to prove the law is necessary to fulfill a compelling government interest.70 While not expressly enumerated in the Constitution, the fundamental right to procreate, derived from the liberty
interest set forth in the Due Process Clause, has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court.71 While the boundaries and limitations of
this procreative liberty are not demarcated, the case law establishing the
right to procreate is extensive.

toward developing artificial wombs (“direct”) and incidental progress made towards their development resulting from “research aimed at solving the problems of human infertility, and research aimed at improving the survival rates of premature infants” (“indirect”). Id. He concludes
that the “most important breakthroughs [advancing the development of full reproductive ectogenesis] will come from indirect research.” Id.
67
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
69
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013).
70
Id. at 938–39.
71
See generally, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925); Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 US 479
(1965); Carey v. Population Services, Int’l., 431 US 678 (1977) (illustrating the fundamental
right to procreative liberty is protected by the Due Process Clause).

BENJAMIN

176

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 20:2

In the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court overturned a
statute prohibiting any person from teaching non-English languages to
children who had not completed an eighth grade education.72 The petitioner in Meyer was a parochial school teacher convicted for teaching a
ten year old child the German language.73 The Court asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint” but also the right “to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free”
people, including marriage, rearing children, and acquiring useful
knowledge.74 While this case was decided under the rational basis standard, the Court held that the prohibition on teaching non-English languages was not even reasonably related to “some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect.”75 The Court affirmed the right of the
teacher to teach and the parents to engage him in the instruction of their
children, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preserves the “power of parents to control the education of their
own.”76
The Meyer decision and the subsequent decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters form the foundation of substantive due process jurisprudence and have long been cited as defining the liberty interest held by
parents in rearing their children in accordance with their preferences and
values.77 In Pierce, the Court overturned an Oregon law mandating, on
criminal penalty, that all “normal” children between the ages of 8 and
16 attend public school.78 Referring to the “doctrine” set forth in Meyer
that parents and guardians have a liberty interest in “direct[ing] the upbringing and education of children under their control,” the Court overturned the statute as violating the Due Process Clause.79 Together,
Meyer and Pierce provide foundational support for the parental liberty
interest in rearing children without interference from the state.
Nineteen years after Meyer, in 1942, the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma held that an Oklahoma statute providing for the forced
sterilization of certain types of criminals infringed upon procreation,
which is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”

72

262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923).
Id. at 397.
74
Id. at 399.
75
Id. at 402.
76
Id. at 401.
77
Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska
to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72 (2006).
78
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
79
Id. at 534–35.
73
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and “one of the basic civil rights of man.”80 The statute at issue enumerated certain crimes as warranting sterilization, such as theft, but excluded other crimes, which were “intrinsically the same quality of offense,” such as embezzlement.81 Since the interest at stake, procreation,
was found to be a “basic liberty,” the Court held that the State’s classification upon which the order to sterilize was determined (here, the type
of crime) ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and could be justified only if the classification was narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling state interest.82
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the director of a Planned Parenthood
clinic and a physician challenged a Connecticut state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to married persons and the use of those
contraceptives.83 The Court held that a “zone of privacy” is “created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees” and that the marital relationship, including the marital bedroom and choices made therein, is
protected by this right of privacy.84
The Court in Carey v. Population Services International overturned a New York statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives, except
by licensed pharmacists, along with other restrictions on the sale and
advertisement of contraceptives.85 In its opinion, the Court affirmed that
the right of privacy protects personal decisions regarding marriage, procreation, child rearing and education, family relationships, and contraception, from unjustified state interference.86 Referring to Griswold and
“its progeny,” the Court held that “the Constitution protects individual
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the
State” and clarified that the “decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices.”87 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court held that a Massachusetts
law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88 It
held that “if under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons
would be equally impermissible.”89 Finding no rational basis upon
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Id. at 537, 541.
Id. at 541.
381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
Id. at 485.
Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977).
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 685, 687.
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971).
Id.
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which the state could distinguish between married and unmarried individuals, who were similarly situated with regards to regulating contraception, the Court struck down the Massachusetts law.90 This holding
explained that the right of privacy underpinning the protection of decisional autonomy, if it “means anything…is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”91
Abortion jurisprudence may also bear on the right to use ectogenesis, which is a matter involving both the right to procreate and the
right to in bodily integrity implicated by the protection of the refusal to
gestate.92 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute
criminalizing the performance or procurement of an abortion, except
where necessary to preserve the woman’s life, violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 The Court affirmed that the
right to privacy includes a woman’s right to seek an abortion, but also
stated that this right to privacy is not absolute.94 Acknowledging the
state interests in protecting health, regulating medical standards, and
preserving prenatal life, the Court described the co-existence of these
interests with the woman’s right to privacy, noting that each state interest “grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term, and, at a
point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’”95 Prior to those
state interests becoming compelling, late in the pregnancy, a physician
and patient are entitled to effectuate abortion “free of interference by the
State.”96 Nineteen years later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court
affirmed this central holding and recognized that in pregnancy, a
woman’s “suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.”97
The Court replaced the trimester framework set forth in Roe and instead
established that viability is the point at which the State may more readily
impose upon a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.98 In a further
90
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attempt to clarify the relationship between a woman’s privacy interest
and the interests of the State, the Court held that only “where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”99 This “undue burden” test, which
prohibits a state’s creation of a “substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose” has not yet been applied to assisted reproduction technologies like ectogenesis, but could quite logically be applied in the future.100
In the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck
down a Texas law criminalizing sodomy between same-sex individuals,
reaffirming the right to privacy relating to personal and family decisions.101 The Court acknowledged that the choice in matters of sexual
conduct “involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”102 Noting that Griswold and Eisenstadt “were part
of the background for the decision” in Roe, the Court in Lawrence emphasized the non-spatial elements of liberty, and the centrality of a person’s right to “make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny” implicit in the Due Process Clause.103 In essence, the bodily
freedoms at issue in the referenced cases are manifestations of less visible, but no less necessary, aspects of self-determination. The Court explained that the drafters of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments “did not presume” to know “the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities” and declined the impossible task
of enumerating every possible liberty that might one day be deserving
of protection.104 In overturning the Texas anti-sodomy law, the Lawrence Court affirmed the central holding from Casey that “our laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”105 It affirmed that choices regarding “these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
the compulsion of the State” and that these “most intimate and personal
choices…central to personal dignity and autonomy” are not only within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, but “central” to the liberty it

99
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guarantees.106 The Court unambiguously asserted that purely moral objections, even those traditionally held by a governing majority, are not
legitimate state interests and, again citing Casey, defined the Court’s
obligation as “to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.”107
The Court’s reluctance to apply majoritarian morality to the intimate decisions of individuals is not unlimited, and it has been cautious
about “extending constitutional protection” to newly-asserted liberties
because doing so “place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate
and legislative action.”108 In Washington v. Glucksberg, petitioners
brought a challenge to a Washington statute criminalizing assisted suicide on the grounds that it violated the liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.109 In its opinion, the
Court described its process for applying substantive due process to asserted liberties and defined a two-part method.110 First, it limited the application of substantive due process to those “fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition… [and] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such
that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.””111
Second, it stated that proponents of an asserted substantive due process
liberty must provide a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest,” meaning that the interest must be stated with specificity.112 The Court in Glucksberg further held that, in applying this twopart method, the right to assisted suicide is “not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause” and ultimately upheld the
statute.113 In doing so, the Court referenced Casey and clarified that
simply because “many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”114
106
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With regards to decisions implicating personal autonomy, the
existing jurisprudence leaves much to be desired in terms of floors and
ceilings. It remains to be seen how the Court’s conclusion in Glucksberg
affects future substantive due process claims, but, even so, there is a
clear history of protection of decisional autonomy in matters relating to
childrearing, sex, contraception, and reproduction.115 John A. Robertson
concluded that “one could reasonably view the Court’s decisions as having established a broad principle of negative reproductive freedom, both
to avoid reproduction and to engage in it without state interference” absent a sufficiently important state interest to justify an imposition on that
negative liberty.116 Self-determination in these matters has been recognized by the Court as essential to our sense of individuality and fundamental to American concepts of liberty.117 While even fundamental liberties are not absolute, the fundamental, personhood-altering, and
defining nature of decisions regarding marriage, procreation, contraception, sexual activity, childrearing, and abortion, render them especially
unsuitable to government interference. As illustrated above, the Court
has held that where the liberty interest at stake falls within this realm of
reproductive and familial choices, the state must provide a sufficiently
important government interest to justify the intrusion on decisional autonomy.118
In the sections that follow, I argue that the decision to use ectogenesis is squarely within this realm of protected choices. Furthermore,
the state interests that might be foreseeably raised in support of restrictions on or prohibitions of the use of ectogenesis shall not rise to
the level that the state’s burden would require, absent the Court’s substantial departure from existing jurisprudence.119 While moral and philosophical objections will undoubtedly be raised against ectogenesis,
Lawrence makes clear that moral objections are not legitimate state interests.120 That something might be repulsive or offensive to some does
not, on its own, give the state special authority to regulate it. An attempt
by the government to prohibit access to ectogenetic technology, or to
place an undue burden on its use, would likely fail for want of a sufficiently important state interest to justify infringement upon a liberty so
fundamental as how to gestate one’s offspring.
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IV. THE SCOPE OF PROCREATIVE LIBERTY IS BROAD ENOUGH TO
ENCOMPASS REPRODUCTION VIA ECTOGENESIS
Coital reproduction has been found to be a fundamental interest
deserving of protection from state interference, absent a compelling
government interest to justify its infringement.121 There remains a question as to whether the use of non-coital reproductive technologies, such
as ectogenesis or in vitro fertilization, is similarly protected and, if so,
whether the fertility status of the individual is relevant to the level of
protection provided by the Constitution. Whether the scope of procreative liberty is broad enough to encompass procreation via assisted reproduction technology has not been addressed directly by the Supreme
Court.122 This is due, at least in part, to the fact that legislative efforts to
limit access to reproductive technologies have occurred only rarely,
which has limited the need for Supreme Court guidance.123 Robertson
speculates that this reflects “how widespread and deep is the social understanding of the right to reproduce through sexual intercourse.”124 In
this section, I argue that the existing bounds of procreative liberty are
broad enough to encompass reproduction with technological assistance,
including ectogenesis.125 Based on the reasoning underlying the decisions that have solidified the recognition of a fundamental right to procreate, as well as persuasive reasoning from legal scholars and non-Supreme Court cases, one should surmise that the Supreme Court would
overturn most instances and forms of state interference with the right to
procreate via reproductive ectogenesis. Whether the scope of procreative liberty is broad enough to encompass ectogenesis and other reproductive technologies will likely turn on the Court’s model of the interests underlying technology-assisted procreation. The outcome of that
analysis will situate the use of reproductive technology in the procreative liberty jurisprudence and determine the level of protection its use is
afforded.
Robertson articulates the essence of the inquiry well. He suggests that the recognition of a fundamental right to procreate via reproductive technologies will depend on “the extent to which the procreative
liberty of individuals and couples establishes the right to acquire children non-coitally, including the right to separate and recombine the
121
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that “procreation [is] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”).
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Robertson, supra note 115, at 453.
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various factors of reproduction as necessary to produce a child.”126 Robertson holds that the underlying interests of individuals seeking to reproduce with technological assistance are nearly identical to the interests of individuals seeking to reproduce through traditional coital
means.127 He states that “their desire to have a family – to beget, bear,
and rear offspring – is as strong” and thus, should be protected to the
same degree as those reproducing without technological assistance.128
He asserts that if “bearing, begetting, or parenting children is protected
as part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences should be protected whether they are achieved coitally or non-coitally.”129 Even
where technology “disaggregates or alters ordinary reproductive practices,” Robertson concludes, “if an important reproductive interest exists, then use of the technology should be presumptively permitted.”130
Robertson’s views are not unanimously held. Matthew R. Eccles’ exploration of whether procreative liberty encompasses the right
to utilize reproductive technologies posits that there are three factors
involved in “every aspect of reproduction: genetic make-up and conception, gestation and labor, and childrearing.”131 Eccles notes that the
availability of in vitro fertilization “makes procreation possible for those
who lack one of the necessary factors of reproduction” and that whether
constitutional protections “extend to a couple’s use of IVF” depends on
whether “the absence of any of those factors lessens a person’s interest
in procreation.”132 Eccles concludes “it is the sum of those values that
equals the whole of the natural reproductive experience” and that the
lack of any one factor “logically lessens the significance of the reproductive experience.”133 While Eccles seems to single out only technology-assisted procreators, the logical conclusion of his line of reasoning
is that males, who do not participate in the gestation and delivery of a
traditionally born child, have a less significant parental experience regarding the resulting child and therefore should have diminished parental rights.134 Without citing scientific or sociological evidence, Eccles
126
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offers bare assertions that couples using gamete donors, adoptive parents, and others who become parents through non-traditional, or noncoital means love their children less (in the case of a father raising the
child conceived with another man’s sperm) or derive “less significant”
meaning from parenthood.135 Therefore, Eccles concludes, “[g]overnment restrictions on the use of IVF invade lesser interests and should
require lesser justifications.”136 Undoubtedly, Eccles would argue that
ectogenesis, which removes the gestation factor from the equation,
should require lesser justifications for state infringement on its use.
In the same paragraph, and in seeming contradiction with his ultimate assertion, Eccles states “it is the fact that a couple joins to reproduce their unique genes, biological traits, and social character in a child
that makes procreation so deeply personal that it should receive utmost
protection from governmental intrusion.”137 In the case of in vitro fertilization where the rearing parents are also the gamete providers, each of
these factors is present. In the case of the use of a gestational surrogate,
each of these factors is present. In the case of ectogenesis, each of these
factors is present. Eccles has not substantiated his claim that children
conceived of in vitro fertilization have a weaker connection to their parents (and thus, the parents should be entitled to lesser protection from
government interference), but even if he had, there are countless applications of reproductive technologies that satisfy his stated criteria for
“procreation so deeply personal” that its protection from state interference should be strictly scrutinized.138
To cast doubt on the Court’s possible recognition of the use of
assisted reproduction technologies as a fundamental procreative liberty,
Eccles argues that at the time Carey v. Population Services International was decided, in vitro fertilization was not an available means of
conception and “if other alternatives like artificial insemination did exist, they were not brought to the attention of the Court.”139 This statement carries the implication that the Court’s decision in Carey and
strong precedential support for procreative liberty, is somehow tempered or qualified by the Court’s lack of awareness of other methods of
conception, such as artificial insemination. If the applicability of the
Court’s reasoning in Carey was limited to “natural” conception and procreation, it did not say so. Eccles’ argument in favor of imputing the
limitation, based on the Court’s lack of awareness of artificial
135
136
137
138
139
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insemination and other reproductive technologies, is unsupportable. His
suggestion that the Court’s decision in Carey was written blind to the
existence of other methods of conception, including artificial insemination, is demonstrably false. While it is true that artificial insemination
and other available reproductive technologies were not raised in argument before the Court in Carey, potentially due to the lack of relevance
to state regulation of contraception, this fact does not suggest a lack of
awareness of such technologies by the Court.
Aside from centuries of documented use of artificial insemination going back to at least 1700, the Court specifically mentions artificial insemination in the 1976 decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, as well as in the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.140 In fact, in
Roe, the Court speaks to the difficulty of reconciling traditional views
of conception with “new embryological data that purport to indicate that
conception is a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event, and by new
medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the ‘morning-after’
pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial
wombs.”141 Therefore, the Court’s 1977 decision in Carey affirmed the
protection of procreative liberty with full awareness of emerging reproductive technologies, and without any express limitation on the applicability of its holding to “natural” procreative methods. In other words, it
is an untenable position to suggest that the timing of the Carey decision
suggests probable constitutional protection for only those engaging in
“natural reproduction, not in reproduction by medical means.”142
The Court’s probable position on whether ectogenesis is within
the scope of fundamental procreative rights is unclear. Carl H. Coleman
states that “[l]ike all questions about the scope of substantive due process protections, the concept of procreative liberty is susceptible to multiple interpretations, depending on the level of generality at which the
principle is defined.”143 Whether the use of ectogenesis and other “ARTs
[Assisted Reproductive Technologies] should be considered part of procreative liberty is as much about values and policy as it is about
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precedent.”144 In 1986, Robertson declared that “IVF [would] force elucidation of the concept of reproductive responsibility, for actions done
to create or manipulate fertilized eggs may directly hurt offspring or
others.”145 This sentiment extends to ectogenesis, a technology on the
near horizon of technological reality, which will force us to consider the
reproductive nature of the human species and the ethical guidelines that
should govern our adoption of technological tools for procreation.146
It is necessary to discuss three sub-issues relating to the scope of
procreative liberty and ectogenesis. The first is the right to privacy and
whether the use of reproductive technologies, including ectogenesis, implicates lesser privacy interests than traditional coital reproduction.147
The second issue is whether the fertility status of the prospective parents
should influence the degree to which we protect their procreative
rights.148 The third issue is the degree of deference to parental preference given in early pregnancy, given the right to terminate a pregnancy
via abortion prior to fetal viability.149 As to privacy and fertility status,
I argue that ectogenesis is functionally identical to traditional, in vivo
gestation and ought to be given the same heightened protection under
the doctrine of procreative liberty.150 Regarding deference to parental
choice regarding pre-viability medical decisions, I will argue that the
Lifchez case, while not a Supreme Court ruling, contains persuasive reasoning in support of the right to utilize ectogenetic technology.151
A. Right to Privacy
A source of procreative liberty under the Due Process Clause is
the due process right to privacy.152 Whether ectogenesis and other reproductive technologies are subject to the same protections as coital procreation may hinge on whether comparable privacy concerns are implicated by their use.153 Eccles asserts that because procreation through in
vitro fertilization occurs in “the openness of a laboratory,” the “procedure diminishes the privacy surrounding the circumstances of conception.”154 He contends that even where “no donor or surrogate may be
144
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used, the procedure involves doctors and assistants who must make vital
decisions about an IVF birth.”155 Presumably, Eccles would apply this
reasoning to other reproductive methods requiring medical advice and
treatment, like ectogenesis, concluding lesser privacy interests are implicated with ex vivo gestation.156
While in the year 1900, “almost all births occurred outside a hospital,” approximately 98.6 percent of all births in the United States now
occur in hospital settings.157 Based on reports from the 46 states which
collect data on prenatal care, only 6 percent of women begin prenatal
care late (in the third trimester) or receive no prenatal care at all.158 This
data does not distinguish between women conceiving coitally and via in
vitro fertilization.159 Eccles’ premise that fewer privacy rights should be
recognized for parents who conceive via reproductive technologies versus coitally ignores the reality that the vast majority of people utilize the
services of doctors and other professionals in bringing forth children
into the world.160 In a country where the receipt of medical services is
an almost universal experience from conception through delivery, any
attempt to distinguish coital reproduction from assisted reproduction on
the grounds of the involvement of “doctors and assistants who must
make vital decisions about an IVF birth” is irrational.161
Furthermore, there are few relationships “imbued with a special
ethos of confidentiality” to the same degree as the doctor-patient relationship.162 Ilene Moore argues that this “ethos of confidentiality derives
from the privacy interests of the patient” and “medical information is
often much more sensitive” than other types of private information.163
While the legal history of physician-patient confidentiality is beyond the
scope of this paper, the pursuit of medical advice or technology-assisted
reproduction should not constitute a waiver or diminishment of constitutionally-protected privacy interests.164 Just as within the spousal relationship, the physician-patient relationship often involves the revelation
155
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of a person’s most sensitive confidences and is thus deserving of protection. Where more than 98.6 percent of mothers give birth in hospitals
and only 6 percent forgo all forms of pre-natal care, the privacy interests
that underlie constitutional protections of procreative liberty must extend equally to those beneficiaries of assisted-reproductive
healthcare.165 Those who would use reproductive technologies such as
in vitro fertilization or ectogenesis have privacy interests identical to
those reproducing via traditional, coital means.166 Accordingly, their
constitutional rights should be identically protected.
B. Fertility Status
As to the fertility status of the plaintiff, in Children of Choice,
John A. Robertson argues that “the principles that underlie a constitutional right to reproduce would seem to apply to the infertile as well”
and “[i]f so, they would have a negative constitutional right to use a
wide variety of reproductive technologies to have offspring.”167 Robertson rejects the arguments of those who assert that the right to reproduce is only recognized where one has the “physical ability to do so.”168
He draws an analogy to the “effect of blindness on the First Amendment
Right to read books” noting that the “receipt of the book’s information
is protected…the means by which the information is received does not
itself determine the presence or absence of First Amendment rights.”169
In the case of ectogenesis, if a woman has the right to procreate through
traditional, in utero gestation, her right to procreate cannot rationally be
abridged merely because the means of gestation is different.170 Ex vivo
gestation of genetic offspring is so similar to traditional gestation that it
should be equally protected, “with the state having the burden of showing severe harm if the practice is unrestricted.”171
Robertson acknowledges that “[t]he unique risks posed by
noncoital reproduction may provide independent justifications for limiting its use.”172 However, the fertility status of prospective parents
should not justify differential treatment because the ultimate goals of
the parents (reproduction and childrearing) are the same regardless of
165
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the method of procreation used.173 The same reasoning applies to ectogenesis: a parent who wishes to gestate a child to term via ectogenesis
and a parent wishing to gestate a child within a woman are both motivated by the desire to bring a healthy child into the world.174 If procreative liberty is protected on the grounds that decisions relating to
parenthood and procreation “could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State,” the choice
of procreative method should be similarly protected for fertile and infertile people alike.175
C. Lifchez: Deference to Parental Preference in Early Pregnancy
In 1990, the Lifchez v. Hartigan case spoke to the application of
the right of privacy to in vitro fertilization and chorionic villi sampling.176 While Lifchez was not a Supreme Court decision, the reasoning
in Lifchez is persuasive and ought to apply to the question of whether
the right to procreate includes the right to utilize ectogenesis in procreation.177
Section 6(7) of the Illinois Abortion Law, at issue in Lifchez,
prohibited “experimentation” on a human fetus unless that experimentation was “therapeutic.”178 Citing Griswold, Carey, Eisenstadt, Roe,
and others, the Lifchez court decided that since the Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman’s right to abort a fetus in the first trimester, it
“must also include the right to submit to a procedure designed to give
information about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to
abort.”179 Further, because there can be no compelling state interest “sufficient to prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy during the
first trimester…there can be no such interest sufficient to intrude upon
these other protected activities during the first trimester.”180
This reasoning is persuasive in the context of ectogenesis. If a
woman has the right to make decisions about her pregnancy, including
chorionic villi sampling and abortion, so should she be able to elect her
method of gestation (a private medical decision) during that time period
where the state’s interests in regulating pregnancy cannot defeat a
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woman’s reproductive decisional autonomy.181 Were a woman to elect
to utilize full ectogenesis to procreate, she would make that decision
during the first trimester, before or immediately following conception.
Before conception, or shortly thereafter, she would elect to gestate her
child ex vivo. Per the analysis in Roe, where the state’s interest in preserving fetal life increases as a pregnancy progresses, the state’s interest
in the potential life contained in a fertilized ovum is dwarfed by the
woman’s interest in determining the means of exercising her procreative
liberty.182 Up until the point of viability, the woman’s interest in choosing to gestate, or declining to gestate, supersedes the state interest in
dictating the fate of the fetus.183 After the point of viability, the state’s
interest in preserving fetal life may be compelling; however, the most
likely method of preserving that life at the point of viability will be preserving the gestational status quo.184 Absent evidence that ectogenesis
will cause harm to that viable infant, to be discussed later, the state will
be unable to articulate a reason for prohibiting the mother’s exercise of
ex vivo gestation, especially during the gestational period prior to viability.185 If the mother has the right to abort the fetus, surely she has the
right to gestate it ex vivo.186
V. MEYER AND PIERCE: THE RIGHT TO REAR CHILDREN
In this section, I propose that even if the Supreme Court did not
ultimately recognize the use of reproductive biotechnologies as within
the scope of procreative liberty, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to freely make child-rearing decisions, including medical decisions during gestation.187 Such decisions
might include the gestational format most suitable for fetal welfare, particularly where in vivo gestation would expose the fetus to the risk of
harm.
The right of parents to raise their children in accordance with the
dictates of their consciences, as established by Meyer and Pierce, further
support a Fourteenth Amendment right for parents to choose to gestate
via ectogenesis.188 Gestation is one of the most fundamental acts of childrearing. Every day, from conception to birth, the parents of the fetus
181
182
183
184
185
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make decisions about how to nurture that child’s development, whether
by nutrition or other types of prenatal care.189 This section argues that
child-rearing begins before birth and that the choices of parents during
gestation, particularly the choices of mothers, are subject to fundamental protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.190
Having been unable to find a legal definition of child-rearing, I
default to the plain meaning of the word “child-rearing.” The Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) defines child-rearing as “the process of
bringing up a child or children,” which is ambiguous as to the starting
point of the rearing process.191 While the OED does not specify the point
in time that this “process” begins, I argue that the logical beginning is
when there is an entity (a child or proto-child) subject to the decisionmaking of its parent or parents and where those parental decisions have
a measurable impact on the health, welfare, and/or nature of existence
of that entity.192 All parents, but especially gestating ones, make decisions about the health and welfare of their child starting long before the
child is born, arguably beginning with conception.193 Prior to viability,
a gestating parent may choose not only how to care for the child, but
whether to do so.194
A large body of research supports the conclusion that maternal
lifestyle and dietary choices have a substantial impact on a wide range
of physical and neurological outcomes for a gestating child.195 Maternal
supplementation with folic acid decreases the risk of neural tube defects
by 50-70%.196 Smoking during pregnancy “increases the risk for several
adverse birth outcomes, including infant death, preterm birth, low birth
weight, and poor intrauterine growth.”197 The effects of “prenatal smoking on child neurodevelopment may include poor language development
and reduction in cognitive functioning.”198 Alcohol consumption by the
189
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gestating mother, when “moderate-to-heavy” is “associated with neurocognitive deficits across several domains, including IQ.”199 Studies
also demonstrate “global volume reductions as well as absolute reductions in the frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes in individuals with a
history of heavy in utero exposure” to alcohol.200
Mothers with fetus-or-infant-impacting medical conditions,
such as gestational diabetes or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),
make decisions that can substantially influence the life-long outcomes
for their children.201 These decisions should be characterized as childrearing decisions to the extent they involve behavioral modifications
made for the purpose of influencing fetal development.202
Gestational diabetes, defined as “glucose intolerance…first diagnosed during pregnancy” has been found to have “serious, long-term
consequences for both baby and mother.”203 The transfer of maternal
glucose but not insulin, which does not transfer to the fetus from the
mother, “force[s] the fetus to increase its own insulin production.”204
The impact on the fetus can be severe and may result in excessive fetal
growth and subsequent increased risk of delivery by caesarean or harm
to the infant during vaginal delivery, “infant respiratory distress syndrome, cardiomyopathy, hypoglycemia, hypomagnesaemia” and other
post-delivery physical issues.205 Furthermore, children “born to mothers
with gestational diabetes have nearly double the risk of developing
childhood obesity, metabolic syndrome, or both” as well as a “life-long
increased risk of glucose intolerance and obesity.”206
This serious gestational complication is influenced by maternal
choices during the pregnancy.207 While the efficacy of dietary interventions for certain groups of at-risk mothers is an unsettled question, the
“ADA recommends that women with gestational diabetes receive nutrition counselling and follow a diet that adequately meets the needs of
their pregnancy but restricts carbohydrates to 35-40% of daily
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calories.”208 The restriction of carbohydrates to 35-40% of the maternal
diet “decreases maternal [and fetal] glucose concentrations” thus mitigating harm to both mother and fetus.209 Exercise is also recommended,
as it has been shown that “prenatal exercise can delay or prevent the
development of gestational diabetes, and…can prevent complications to
the baby.”210 The impact of maternal diet and exercise decisions on the
health outcomes of the fetus and post-delivery child therefore strongly
suggests that the process of child-rearing begins before birth.211
The prevention of mother-to-infant transmission of HIV is a
clear example of the impact that parental decision-making can have on
the health and upbringing of a child during gestation.212 Globally, 90%
of children infected with HIV contract the infection from their mothers
in utero.213 The avenues for mother-to-child transmission of HIV include
“during pregnancy… childbirth…or breastfeeding.”214 Without pre- and
post-natal medical interventions, the rate of mother-to-child transmission is between 15-45%.215 This transmission rate can be brought below
2.7% with effective intervention.216 Recommended interventions include maternal use of antiretroviral medication during pregnancy and
delivery and a scheduled cesarean delivery.217 In addition to these, the
post-delivery administration of antiretroviral therapies to the child to
minimize the risk of infection, along with avoiding breastfeeding the
infant to prevent viral transmission through breast milk.218 The decisions
an HIV-positive mother makes during her gestation and delivery, including treatment with antiretroviral drugs and scheduled cesarean delivery, can be physically invasive and interfere with the mother’s sense
of bodily integrity.219 Yet these choices are made for the purpose of
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influencing the child’s health and wellbeing, and thus should be protected as child-rearing decisions.220
Gestating parents begin the process of child-rearing, decisionmaking for the purpose of bringing up a healthy child, via the careful
consideration of medical, occupational, and lifestyle choices.221 For example, new research suggests that the use of selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (anti-depressants, such as Prozac and Zoloft) during
the second and third trimesters of pregnancy is “associated with an increased risk of [autism spectrum disorder],” even after controlling for
maternal depression.222 In response to this finding, Susan Hyman, a “former chairperson of the American Academy of Pediatrics committee on
autism,” recommended that “prospective mothers…have a serious discussion with their doctor about the possibility of other types of therapies
for depression and anxiety, such as counseling.”223 Whether the finding
of this study is supported by further research and whether the risks of
maternal depression exceed the increased risks of autism, decisions regarding maternal health and welfare during pregnancy are made in light
of possible risks to the fetus and subsequent child.224 A meta-analysis of
twenty-nine English-language studies on maternal work and pregnancy
outcomes found an association of “physically demanding work, prolonged standing, and shift and night work, with an adverse outcome of
pregnancy.”225 Occupational exposure to “environmental chemicals”
such as pesticides, formaldehyde, anesthetic gases, certain metals, plastics, and solvents can cause serious, sometimes life-long harm to the
fetus.226 Those in professions involving risk-inducing physical demands
or chemical exposure, such as manufacturing, agriculture, and
220
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (holding "that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children").
221
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DURING PREGNANCY (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/during.html.
222
Takoua Boukhris et al., Antidepressant Use During Pregnancy and the Risk of Autism Spectrum Disorder in Children, 170 JAMA PEDIATRICS 117, 123 (2016).
223
Ariana Eunjung Cha, Maternal exposure to anti-depressant SSRIs linked to autism in children, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2015/12/14/maternal-exposure-to-anti-depressant-ssris-linked-to-autism-in-children/.
224
Boukhris, supra note 222, at 117.
225
Ellen L. Mozurkewich et al., Working Conditions and Adverse Pregnancy Outcome: A
Meta-Analysis, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 623, 633 (2000).
226
For a discussion of environmental toxins and occupational exposure in gestating women,
see THE AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR
UNDERSERVED WOMEN, EXPOSURE TO TOXIC ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS (2013),
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/ExposuretoToxic.pdf.

BENJAMIN

2020]

ECTOGENESIS

195

healthcare, may choose to sacrifice career development or income to
influence the health of their developing fetus.227 This balancing of parental welfare with child welfare is arguably the essence of parental decision-making.228
The array of maternal choices during gestation that influence fetal development are too numerous to thoroughly discuss in this paper.229
The few examples I have highlighted demonstrate that maternal decision-making during gestation can affect the child for the duration of the
child’s life.230 This suggests that the process of child-rearing should be
viewed as a decisional continuum beginning with conception and continuing at least until the child reaches maturity.231 The decisions made
during pregnancy can influence child development to at least the same
degree as post-delivery decisions about education, medical treatment,
and religious upbringing.232 Since these gestation-concurrent decisions
are at least as influential on the child, and the motivations for them are
the same (promoting child-welfare), the line of cases beginning with
Meyer and Pierce should accordingly protect those decisions made by
parents during gestation as child-rearing decisions.233
In summary, the decision to gestate one’s child ex vivo is comparable to any other decision made during gestation and should be comparably protected.234 A mother who is HIV-positive or who suffers from
psychiatric conditions requiring treatment with teratogenic medication
might choose to gestate via ectogenesis to avoid physical harm to the
developing fetus.235 Women who work in high-risk professions might
also elect to do the same. Parents wishing to have an egalitarian division
of parental involvement might choose ectogenesis to preserve the equality of their contributions.236 In nearly any case, the decision to gestate
227
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one’s child utilizing ectogenetic technology is as influential on the
child’s welfare as any post-delivery parenting decision, and thus should
be protected as a child-rearing decision under the Due Process
Clause.237 Should the Court find that the use of ectogenesis outside the
scope of procreative liberty, the protection of parental rights to rear their
children provides another possible avenue for enabling the use of the
technology.238
VI. UNDUE BURDEN
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court established “the undue burden test in an effort to balance fairly the interests between potential life and a woman’s privacy.”239 This decision revised some portions of the holding in Roe, clarifying that it is permissible to regulate
the receipt of an abortion pre-viability “provided the regulation does not
place a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking an abortion.”240 The Court considered each of the five provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion law at issue, asking whether any of the provisions imposed such an obstacle.241 The Court found no undue burden imposed
by the Pennsylvania law’s medical emergencies definition, informed
consent requirement, mandatory 24-hour waiting period, reporting requirements, and parental consent provisions.242 However, finding that a
spousal notification requirement would grant husbands a “troubling degree of authority” over their wives, the Court invalidated the provision
as imposing an undue burden on a woman’s fundamental right to seek
an abortion.243
Whether the undue burden test would be applied in a challenge
to a ban on ectogenesis is unclear. In this section, the argument is made
to apply the undue burden test to such a challenge, as it is uniquely wellsuited to balancing the possible state interests with procreative liberty.
Should the Court encounter a challenge to a regulation of ectogenesis,
it should consider whether the regulation places a “substantial obstacle
tank/2018/09/24/stay-at-home-moms-and-dads-account-for-about-one-in-five-u-s-parents/,
which shows a rise in the percent of stay-at-home dads between 1989 to 2016, while the rate of
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in the path” of a parent seeking to procreate.244 Accordingly, this paper
argues that a ban on ectogenesis would pose an undue burden on the
fundamental right to procreate for many people.245
A. Surrogacy as an Alternative
An opponent to the use of ectogenesis may argue that a prohibition would never place a substantial obstacle in the path of an individual’s right to procreate, given the possibility of gestational surrogacy.
The “resort to donor gametes or surrogates is not an easy choice for
infertile couples” and is typically only utilized where “previous attempts
at pregnancy have failed.”246 Surrogacy can strain the marital or parentchild relationship because “it intrudes a third party … into the usual situation of a two-party parenthood.”247 Imposing the intrusion of an unwanted third party into the marital and parenting relationship is arguably
a violation of marital or parental liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause, particularly where a privacy-protecting alternative (such as ectogenesis) is available.248 The enforceability of surrogacy contracts varies by jurisdiction, and thus, many intended parents must bear the risk
of uncertainty that their genetic child will not be transferred to them at
birth.249 Parents in non-enforcing states invest “considerable time, energy, and emotion in finding the [chosen] surrogate and initiating pregnancy in reliance on [the gestational mother’s] promise” to relinquish
the child at birth.250 Gestational surrogacy is more expensive than traditional surrogacy (where the gestational mother is also the genetic donor)
because the intended parents must bear the additional costs of in vitro
fertilization.251 The uncertainty, financial exposure, and emotional strain
render surrogacy an unviable option for many.252
Importantly, the mere availability of alternatives does not suggest that the denial of access to ectogenesis is not an undue burden on
the right to procreate. The decision in Lawrence speaks to the likely
244
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protection of ectogenesis as a matter of procreative decisional autonomy, even when not the only procreative method available, if one considers the specific right adjudicated in that case. The Texas statute criminalized sodomy, defined as sexual intercourse involving oral or anal
copulation with a member of the same sex.253 The statute did not criminalize homosexuality generally, but rather specific methods of intercourse between same-sex couples falling outside of traditional, heterosexual penis-in-vagina sex.254 The Court’s task in Lawrence, then, was
not to evaluate whether petitioners had the right to choose whether to
engage in sexual activity but to choose the manner of romantic interaction (heterosexual vs. homosexual) or method of sexual activity (sodomy vs. non-sodomy). Presumably, the petitioners in Lawrence faced
no material barrier to engaging in heterosexual relationships or non-sodomitic intercourse.255 Sodomy was not the petitioners’ only physically
available option for exercising the right to engage in sex and relationships, but the option most suitable to their pursuit of self-actualization
and personal happiness.256 The Court affirmed that decisional autonomy
in matters regarding such intimate activities as love, sex, family, and
reproduction was fundamental, and intrusion upon that autonomy by the
state cannot be based on moral arguments.257 In other words, the Court
found that denying the participants privacy regarding their choice of
sexual partner imposed an undue burden on a fundamental liberty interest.258
The opinion did not condition the right of privacy upon sodomy
being the only available sexual option to an individual. The decision
was not a recognition of the right to engage in homosexual relationships
or sodomy only in those extreme cases where no heterosexual option
existed. Instead, the Court recognized that “[t]he State cannot demean
[petitioners’] existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.”259 Importantly, the Court found that a person’s
liberty to choose the method of satisfying their fundamental human
needs is a matter requiring the utmost protection from state intrusion.260
The Court specifically elaborates upon other like personal decisions
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requiring this level of protection, including procreation and childrearing.261
Since a fundamental right to procreate has been recognized, and
repeatedly affirmed, the reasoning in Lawrence should suggest that it is
not merely the right to procreate versus not procreate that is protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the right
to choose the method or manner of procreation that enables a person to
satisfy their most fundamental human aspirations. To protect the right
to choose whether to procreate but not how to procreate contravenes the
reasoning in Lawrence, for if the Court intended to carve out a specific
exception for sodomy, it could have done so. Instead, the Court held that
in the broad realms of family, sex, relationships, and procreation, the
choices an individual makes regarding whether and how to accomplish
these basic intimacies cannot be limited or controlled without a sufficiently important government interest.262 In terms of elective ectogenesis, which is simply traditional sexual reproduction with gestation in an
extracorporeal womb, Lawrence seems to provide protection. The fundamental right to procreate exists, as discussed previously, and Lawrence suggests that the right to choose the method or manner of exercising this right can likewise not be infringed upon without the state unduly
burdening the right itself.
An intended parent’s decision to gestate via ectogenesis is an
expression of fundamental decisional autonomy in matters of procreation, child-rearing, and bodily integrity. The availability of surrogacy
does not remove the undue burden on procreative liberty that would occur from a ban on access to ex vivo gestational technologies. Therefore,
given this undue burden, any prohibition on the use of ectogenesis
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
B. Additional Circumstances Suggesting Undue Burden
Fetal welfare, financial stability, and professional development
are implicated in the trade-offs made by most mothers or prospective
mothers. As of 2018, the most common occupations for women in the
United States included janitorial/cleaning, licensed nursing, education,
waitressing, retail, and other like positions.263 Such positions involve
“physically demanding work, prolonged standing, and shift and night
work,” and occupational exposure to environmental chemicals that are
261
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associated with increased risk of birth defects.264 Women engaged in
these occupations may experience a particularly undue burden from infringement on the negative liberty to utilize ectogenesis because they
are subject to the choice between a healthy child and financial stability.
Currently more than 40 percent of American mothers are the sole or
primary source of income for their families.265 Where those mothers are
also employed in occupations that might undermine fetal welfare, a prohibition on access to ectogenesis would amount to a substantial obstacle
to procreation.
A 2001 meta-analysis revealed that the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers is greater than the wage gap between women and
men.266 Childbirth imposes a substantial decrease in career development
and earnings to women, and while the precise causes are not fully understood, it has been suggested that an important portion of this cost is
the time expended giving birth and recovering from the physical demands and complications of childbirth.267 Perceptions of pregnant mothers as “receiving special treatment” or having “diminished dedication to
… their career” may compound these material affects.268 Studies conclude that visibly pregnant women are perceived as “less committed to
their jobs, less dependable, and less authoritative” which, if true, is a
cost borne by all working women who wish to bear children.269 Ectogenesis would alleviate these professional costs.
Maternal health status is another condition that might render a
prohibition on ectogenesis an undue burden. HIV- positive women must
often take steps to prevent the transmission of HIV to their children.270
Ectogenesis would enable these women to instead gestate their children
ex vivo, avoiding the chance of infection and the invasion of bodily integrity that a cesarean delivery might entail. Women at risk of other
medical complications from pregnancy would also have access to safe
procreation. For women whose health and safety are compromised by
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gestation, a prohibition on ectogenesis would constitute an undue burden.
Accordingly, a prohibition on ectogenesis will place a substantial obstacle in the path to procreation for many American women. Accordingly, the Court should apply strict scrutiny on any prohibition, pursuant to the undue burden test set forth in Casey.
VII. STATE INTERESTS
Assuming the Court were to find the right to elective ectogenesis
within the protective ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the state would bear the burden of establishing that its law
burdening the exercise of procreational choice was narrowly tailored to
satisfy a compelling government interest.271 Should the Court determine
that the use of ectogenesis is a privacy right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state would be unable to
place an undue burden on the exercise of that right absent proof that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government interest.272 In this section, this paper will identify and evaluate several state
interests that might be raised in support of the regulation or prohibition
of ectogenesis. Whether these interests would likely rise to the level of
compelling or legitimate, as necessary to meet the State’s burden under
a strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis, respectively, will also be discussed.
A. Health and Safety
The state’s interest in health and safety, in the context of ectogenesis, would likely manifest itself in the following categories: protection of maternal health; prevention of harm to children born from ectogenesis; and regulation of the practice of medicine. The safety of
ectogenetic technology will be a primary state interest, and almost certain to be considered compelling by a reviewing Court.
1. Preservation of Maternal Health and Life
The government might assert that its interest in protecting maternal health and safety is a compelling interest justifying restricting access to ectogenesis. While I do not dispute that protecting maternal
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health and safety is a compelling interest, that goal is not even rationally
related to the prohibition of ectogenesis.
First, certain medical ailments increase the risk of injury or death
to the gestating mother, such as preeclampsia. Preeclampsia is a medical
condition occurring in 6-8 percent of pregnancies in the United States
and whose risks range from high blood pressure to seizures, kidney failure, and death.273 Since the only cure for preeclampsia is delivery of the
fetus, although mild symptoms can be mitigated with various medical
interventions, preterm induced delivery may be required in severe cases
to prevent maternal and loss of fetal life.274 Ectogenesis would enable a
mother with preeclampsia to transfer the baby from her uterus to an extracorporeal gestation chamber, which could then support the infant until term.275 Without ectogenesis, particularly when the symptoms are severe or the fetus is periviable, women must choose between their
physical health and the life of their fetus.276
Second, pregnancy involves countless risks to the health of the
mother, which vary in seriousness depending on her age and health status.277 Even “normal” pregnancies involve physical symptoms, imposing on maternal bodily security.278 These gestational symptoms often
include “morning sickness, dizziness, headaches, bone and muscle
aches, loss of visual acuity, bleeding gums, breathlessness, heartburn,
varicose veins and hemorrhoids.”279 During delivery, many women experience “vaginal tearing and psychological trauma resulting from
childbirth itself.”280 While maternal morbidity and mortality vary geographically and by socio-economic status, “the World Health Organisation estimates that approximately [fifteen] percent of all pregnant
women will develop a ‘potentially life-threatening complication’ as a
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direct result of their reproductive enterprise.”281 In light of the countless
physical risks to maternal health imposed by in vivo gestation, an attempt by the state to abridge access to ectogenesis could not be rationally related to the state interest of preserving maternal health. Limiting
access to ectogenetic technologies would, at best, be neutral to maternal
health and, at worst, impose a serious risk of physical harm to the
mother.
2.

Preventing Harm to Children born from Ectogenesis

Even if procreation via ectogenesis is found to be a fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause, the state will be able to regulate its
use if the state can establish that children born from ectogenesis are
likely to be harmed by the technology. It is indisputable that the safety
of babies and children is a compelling government interest.282 If ectogenetic technology were shown to cause birth defects, psychological problems, or other harms to those born from the technology, the state would
likely prevail in a challenge to a law banning its use. However, where
no harm has been demonstrated, speculation about the harms to babies
cannot overcome strict scrutiny.283 Speculation cannot withstand strict
scrutiny, but the Court will defer to Congressional scientific findings
where medical uncertainty exists.284
The state may argue that a ban on ectogenesis satisfies a compelling state interest because the human experimentation required to develop the technology is harmful to the life of children born from the
unperfected technology. In their 1985 book Making Babies: The New
Science and Ethics of Conception, Peter Singer and Deane Wells state
that legal and ethical limitations on human experimentation pose a barrier to the testing and development of ectogenetic technologies.285 They
argue that studies on non-human animals will be less applicable to humans (compared to in vitro fertilization experiments) because data about
the “mental and psychological” aspects of human development,
281
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essential facets of a normal human existence, cannot be understood from
such studies.286 Commenting that “[w]ork on ectogenesis will forever
remain unjustifiable,” given the unethical nature of attempting to gestate
babies ex vivo who might be “brought into existence…destined for a
deprived human life,” Singer and Wells identify one ethically-sound avenue for developing ectogenesis.287 As discussed in an earlier section,
medical advances in the treatment of premature infants have led to
steady progress towards the survival of pre-term infants born at increasingly earlier weeks of development.288 With this gradual development
of life-saving measures for premature infants, we may eventually “reach
the point at which the human embryo produced through IVF can be kept
alive without ever putting it inside a human body.”289 Recognizing that
premature infants have higher rates of abnormalities “because a defective fetus is more likely to abort spontaneously or be born prematurely
than a normal [healthy] fetus,” the authors suggest attempting to isolate
the effects of prematurity from the effects of ectogenesis.290 By gathering data about the outcomes for these children, we could determine
whether ectogenesis is a safe technology without ever engaging in human experimentation for purely scientific purposes.291 I agree with their
proposal for an ethical pathway toward ectogenesis. Should full ectogenesis emerge as a safe by-product of advances in neonatal intensive
care, the state’s restriction of access to it could not be justified as being
rationally related to the interest of preserving fetal life.
Another possible scenario that might emerge is the prohibition
on full ectogenesis prior to the clear establishment of its safety to children born from the technology. If ectogenesis were to become available
as reproductive biotechnology, but there existed a lack of medical consensus regarding the outcomes for children born of the technology, the
state might seek to ban its use entirely. Pursuant to the 2007 holding
from Gonzales v. Carhart, a high level of deference would be granted
to any scientific findings accepted by the legislature.292
In the case of Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld
the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which criminalized the intentional performance of intact dilation and evacuation abortions (D&X),
also known as “partial birth abortions.”293 The law provided no
286
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exception for preservation of maternal health.294 Congress relied on “[a]
select panel of physicians” who “testified about the inherent health dangers and drawbacks of D&X procedures,” despite the fact that ninetyone percent of “doctors with relevant experience in performing abortions actually oppose[d] the ban.”295 Stating that the Court “has given
state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas
where there is medical and scientific uncertainty,” the majority articulated a high standard of deference to Congressional scientific findings.296 The Court thus deferred to the Congressional findings that intact
dilation and evacuation (D&X) was “never medically necessary” and
upheld the Act.297
One critic of the deferential standard set forth in Gonzales stated
that the Court’s “lower bar…for the scrutiny of scientific and medical”
findings by Congress “invites collateral attacks” on rights “otherwise
entitled to constitutional protection.”298 While “[j]ustice recognizes no
congressional right to legislate away reality or the Constitution,” by
granting broad deference to Congress-accepted science, the holding in
Gonzales suggests that absent medical consensus, the legislature’s scientific findings need not be vigorously tested.299 Regarding ectogenesis,
this may manifest as a denial of access based on loosely supported legislature-accepted science.
3. Regulation of the Practice of Medicine
The state may assert an interest in regulating ectogenesis based
on its interest in regulating the practice of medicine. The regulation of
medicine has been described as “a particular creature of state regulation
because it is the nexus of…traditional areas of police power regulation”
including regulating the professions and preserving public health and
safety.300 In Gonzalez v. Carhart, a portion of Congressional support for
the act at issue was based in the desire to mitigate the “effects on the
medical community and on its reputation caused by the practice of
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partial-birth abortion.”301 Citing Glucksberg, the Court held that “[t]here
can be no doubt the government ‘has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.’”302 The legislative history of
the 2003 Act suggested concern from Congress that failing to prohibit
the use of intact dilation and extraction methods would “further coarsen
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and
innocent human life.”303
Ectogenesis will necessarily occur in a medically supervised
context. The sensitive balance of nutrients, hormones, and waste removal will require sophisticated medical technology and expertise to
operate and maintain.304 The involvement of medical professionals will
invite some state involvement, due to the police power to regulate the
medical profession. In Gonzales, the Court considered seriously the
state’s legitimate interest in regulating medical practices so as to promote “respect for the dignity of human life.”305 The state may introduce
rationale for the prohibition or regulation of ectogenesis on the grounds
that the symbolic severance of the gestational bond between mother and
child could undermine the stability of the family unit or the value of a
human life. It might argue that allowing physicians to engage in this
“disaggregate[ion] or alter[ation of] ordinary reproductive practices,”
undermines public confidence in the medical profession.306 These, and
other arguments based on the symbolic impact of ectogenesis, could be
held to be legitimate state interests. Should the Court find ectogenetic
reproduction outside the scope of procreative liberty, and thus subject
to rational basis review, the state’s legitimate interest in regulating the
medical profession could be sufficient to justify a regulation or ban on
ectogenesis.
B. Illegitimate Government Interests
Interests that would be deemed illegitimate include arguments
based on moral or religious dogma and, under strict scrutiny, arguments
that are speculative in nature.
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The Lawrence Court held that arguments based on purely moral
assertions are not even legitimate state interests.307 Moral or religious
arguments against the use of ectogenesis could include that the technology is an offense against G-d or against nature and that a woman utilizing ectogenesis “would be shirking her obligations as a mother and
denying her essential identity as a woman.”308 Whether the Court characterizes ectogenesis as a fundamental procreative liberty or not, such
moral arguments are not even legitimate state interests and cannot be
used to justify a ban under any standard of review.
If reproduction via ectogenesis is protected as a fundamental
procreative liberty or privacy interest under the Due Process Clause,
many of the arguments made in opposition to it must fail as too speculative. As previously discussed, strict scrutiny requires the state to prove
that the law is narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest.309 Speculative harms are insufficient.310 Some of the many highlyspeculative arguments against ectogenesis include that ectogenesis will
lead to the mass extermination of women, that it will be used to farm
human organs or to grow slaves, that it will destroy traditional family
structures, and that children born from ectogenesis will be “nothing
more than psychological monsters.”311 Each of these concerns evokes a
salient image of dystopia and each reflects the presumably widely-held
intuition that the mother-child gestational bond serves an important societal function. However, since speculative harms cannot justify the denial of a fundamental liberty, under strict scrutiny, a prohibition of ectogenesis on these grounds would fail.312 Under rational basis review,
speculative harms can satisfy the requirement of a legitimate state interest rationally related to the law in question.313 If reproduction via ectogenesis is not within the scope of fundamental procreative liberty or
child-rearing, some or all of these hypothetical dystopian visions could
be raised in support of its regulation.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Ectogenesis exists on the reproductive frontier. As technological
advances in neonatal intensive care occur, the emergence of new methods of reproduction will present novel legal challenges for lawmakers
and the Supreme Court. As argued above, the right to use ectogenesis to
reproduce involves the rights to procreate,314 not to gestate,315 and to
make child-rearing decisions autonomously without state interference.316 If the right to utilize this technology is found to be fundamental,
which would be logical given the existing reproductive privacy jurisprudence, the Court will approach from a baseline of strict scrutiny, prohibiting the state from unduly burdening access absent a compelling
state interest. Whereas if the use of ectogenesis does not fall within the
scope of the Due Process Clause, any restriction that is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest will suffice.
The state of substantive due process jurisprudence regarding
procreative liberty and reproductive biotechnologies leaves enough uncharted territory to make predictions futile. In any case, we must refrain
from proclaiming ectogenesis “indecent and unnatural,” 317 given the potential gains to humanity, especially for us gestating humans, from its
liberating reproductive applications.
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